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Is Tiger Woods’s Swing Really a Work of Art? Defining the Line 
Between the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment
By: Michael Suppappola
The aim of art is to represent not the outward appearance of things, but 
their inward significance.  – Aristotle
Those who do not want to imitate anything, produce nothing. – Salvadore 
Dali
I. Introduction
The age of the celebrity athlete is upon us.  For better or worse, no longer does 
your local hero merely hit game-winning home runs or sink buzzer-beating fall away 
jumpers.  He now sells you t-shirts and educates you on a virtually endless number of 
topics, from which sneaker will help you jump the highest to which fast-food 
establishment will best satisfy your appetite.
A quick walk through your local supermarket will confirm that it is impossible to 
escape the reach of celebrity athletes in today’s culture.  Michael Jordan looms down at 
you from cereal boxes; Donovan McNabb stares at you from soup cans; Sammy Sosa 
invites you to try a can of soda; Markus Naslund smirks at you from the cover of a video 
game; Barry Bonds scowls at you from a magazine rack.  Indeed, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to imagine a world without celebrity athletes.
Athletic success often translates into an economic windfall from sources outside 
the athletic domain: “[t]hrough endorsements, licensing, sponsorships, and television 
spots, advertisers offer a seemingly unlimited source of income for today’s most popular 
2athletes.”1  Due to the increasing economic value of popular athletes’ identities, athletes 
have become determined to “hold onto the hottest property they know: themselves.”2
The right of publicity affords professional athletes the right to control the commercial use 
of his or her identity.3
The majority of states now recognize the right of publicity, either at common law 
or by statute.4  As with other forms of intellectual property, however, allowing athletes to 
retain a right of publicity is not free, but is “imposed at the expense of future creators and 
of the public at large . . .”5 Specifically, the right of publicity often collides with a core 
concern of the First Amendment, described by Justice Brandeis as the right to “self-
expression in all forms.”6
In Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Association,7 Judge Tacha 
noted that “[t]hrough their pervasive presence in the media, sports and entertainment 
celebrities come to symbolize certain ideas and values . . . [they] are an important 
element of the shared communicative resources of our cultural domain.”  Thus, the 
public’s First Amendment right to use an athlete’s image for purposes of expression often 
conflicts with the athlete’s right of publicity.  Courts have struggled to establish the 
boundaries between the right of publicity and the First Amendment.
This Note attempts to explore the various justifications for affording professional 
athletes a right of publicity and how to best balance publicity rights with First 
1
  Michael J. Breslin, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.: Turning an Athlete’s Publicity Over to the 
Public, 11 J. Intell. Prop. L. 369, 371 (2004).
2 Id. 
3
  Raymond T. Nimmer, The Law of Computer Technology, § 16:22. The Right of Publicity (2004).
4 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 28:1, at 6-5 (4th ed. 2000).
5 ETW, Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 932 (6th Cir. 2003).
6 J. Thomas McCarthy, 2 The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 8:2 (2d ed. 2000).
7
 95 F.3d 959, 972 (1996).
3Amendment concerns.  Part II traces the history of the right of publicity, from its genesis 
in early Twentieth Century right to privacy cases to its current status as a generally 
recognized common law and statutory right.  Part III focuses on the 
“commercial/newsworthy” distinction in early right of publicity cases, and how courts 
attempted to limit the boundaries of the right of publicity in the face of First Amendment 
concerns.  Part IV addresses the renewed battle between the First Amendment and the 
right of publicity in a series of court cases from the early 1990s through the present.  
Parts V analyzes the Sixth’s Circuit controversial decision in ETW Corp. v. Jireh 
Publishing, Inc., which held that an artist’s First Amendment right to use the image of 
Tiger Woods in an expressive work of art trumped Woods’s right of publicity.  Part VI 
critiques the various balancing tests offered by courts in right of publicity cases.  Part VII 
attempts to answer the fundamental question of whether an athlete’s right of publicity 
should be recognized by the courts at all.  Part VIII concludes. 
II. History of the Right of Publicity
A.  The Right to Privacy and the Commercial/Newsworthy Distinction
Ironically, the right of publicity found it origins in the common law right to 
privacy.  In 1890, Harvard Law Review published an article authored by Samuel D. 
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis entitled “The Right to Privacy.”8  This influential article 
argued that “the powers of the common law should be used to protect a right to privacy 
by creating a ‘quiet zone’ in each person’s life, immune from the prying of neighbors, the 
press and the public.”9
8
 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
9
 Breslin, supra note 1, at 372.
4Following publication of the article, courts and legislatures began to recognize 
several new tort rights under the label “right to privacy.”10  In his 1960 article, “Privacy,” 
University of California Law School Dean William Prosser articulated the four general 
torts as invasion of privacy by: (1) intrusion; (2) disclosure; (3) false-light; and (4) 
appropriation.11
Nevertheless, courts quickly recognized that “a full-blown right in individuals to 
control the dissemination of personal information would overwhelm the countervailing 
constitutional interest in free speech.”12  Courts began to draw a distinction between 
“newsworthy” speech and “commercial” speech; the former was speech fully protected 
by the First Amendment, and the latter was not.13  Newsworthy speech was generally 
defined as “the public communication of accurate, newsworthy information.”14
“Commercial” speech, however, was considered unprotected by the First 
Amendment and became vulnerable to right to privacy claims.  A “large percentage of 
the early ‘commercial use’ cases involved advertisements or promotions using the names 
or faces of people who did not desire that form of notoriety.”15  For example, in Pavesich 
v. New England Life Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of Georgia held that “the 
publication of a picture of a person, without his consent, as a part of an advertisement, for 
10
 Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 
68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 296 (1983).
11 Id. at 296-97.
12
 Amicus Curiae Brief of Law Professors in Support of Jireh Publishing, Inc. at 6, ETW Corp. v. Jireh 
Publishing, Inc. (2000).
13 See Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1940) (right to privacy limited by 
newsworthiness privilege); Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68, 74 (Ga. 1905) (same).
14 Id.
15
 Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 7.
5the purpose of exploiting the publisher's business, is a violation of the right of privacy of 
the person whose picture is reproduced . . .”16
In addition to commercial advertisement cases, a number of courts held that 
speech intended to “entertain” also qualified as “commercial speech.”17  For example, in 
Binns v. Vitagraph Company of America, the Court of Appeals of New York held that 
speech used “to amuse those who paid to be entertained by it” constituted “commercial” 
speech.18  Thus, so long as speech was not characterized as “newsworthy,” liability “for 
commercial appropriation could be imposed at will.”19
B. Problems with the Common Law Invasion of Privacy by Appropriation
Nevertheless, a conspicuous weakness of the “invasion of privacy” doctrine was 
revealed when public figure plaintiffs attempted to take advantage of the new cause of 
action.  The “fundamental justification” for a person’s right to privacy is that “every 
person has a right to be free from mental distress and indignity.”20  Accordingly, a 
plaintiff could not prevail unless the court found that commercial appropriation of his or 
her identity resulted in “harm to a plaintiff’s mental well-being as measured by tort-based 
mental distress.”21  Thus, for public figure plaintiffs, courts would rarely find “‘indignity’ 
or ‘mental distress’ when the plaintiff’s identity was already in widespread use in the 
16
 50 S.E. 68, 81 (Ga. 1905).  See Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532 (Kan. 1918) (plaintiff’s picture used in 
advertisement for drygoods store); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076 (Mo. 1911) (plaintiff’s photograph 
used in advertisement for jewelry business).
17
 Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 7.
18 Binns v. Vitagraph Company of America, 103 N.E. 1108, 1119 (N.Y. 1913).
19
 Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 8.
20
 Breslin, supra note 1, at 373 (emphasis added).
21 Id.  
6media.”22  Conversely, many athletes and entertainers actively strive to make themselves 
into household names.
For example, in O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., Pabst used the photograph of well-
known Philadelphia Eagles quarterback David O’Brien on an advertising calendar 
without O’Brien’s consent.23  O’Brien brought suit against Pabst for invasion of his right 
to privacy, claiming that he was damaged by Pabst’s misappropriation of his identity.24
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that O’Brien could not 
prevail: “considered from the standpoint merely of an invasion of plaintiff's right of 
privacy, no case was made out, because plaintiff was an outstanding national football 
figure and had completely publicized his name and his pictures.”25  The Fifth Circuit 
agreed on appeal, holding that O’Brien was not a private person and “the publicity he got 
was only that which he had been constantly seeking and receiving.”26
Nevertheless, Judge Holmes’ dissenting opinion in O’Brien foreshadowed the 
creation of a right of publicity.  Judge Holmes argued that a plaintiff should be entitled to 
recover “the reasonable value of the use in trade and commerce of his picture for 
advertisement purposes, to the extent that such use was appropriated by [Pabst].”27  Judge 
Holmes distinguished the right to privacy from what would later become the right to 
publicity:
The right to privacy is distinct from the right to use one’s name or picture 
for purposes of commercial advertisement.  The latter is a property right 
22 Id.
23
 124 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1941).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 170.
27 Id.
7that belongs to every one; it may have much or little, or only a nominal 
value; but it is a personal right, which may not be violated with 
impunity.28
C. The Birth of the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity was first recognized in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps 
Chewing Gum, Inc.29 In Haelan, two rival baseball card manufacturers argued over the 
exclusive right to use the image of a professional baseball player to promote their 
product.30  The “plaintiff’s case hinged on asserting an exclusive property right in the 
baseball player’s images that appeared on the cards.”31  The defendant argued that the 
plaintiff’s only viable claim for relief was violation of the right to privacy, which would 
fail because, as in O’Brien, a professional baseball player would be unable to show that 
he suffered mental distress from the publication of his photograph.32
The Second Circuit, however, concluded “a man has a right in the publicity value 
of his photograph.”33  The court explained:
This right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’  For it is common 
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and 
ballplayers), far from having their feelings bruised through public 
exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer 
received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their 
countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and 
subways.  This right of publicity would usually yield them no money 
unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any 
other advertiser from using their pictures.
Just one year later, the development of the right of publicity was “further 
cultivated by Melvin Nimmer in his seminal article The Right of Publicity.”34  Nimmer 
28 Id.
29 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
30 Id. at 867.
31
 Breslin, supra note 1, at 375.
32 Id.
8argued, “traditional privacy law could not adequately protect the commercial interests 
people held in themselves because its protection was limited to those situations involving 
embarrassment or humiliation stemming from unauthorized advertising use.”35
Moreover, Nimmer argued that both celebrities and private persons should be 
afforded the right of publicity: 
It is impractical to attempt to draw a line as to which persons have achieved the 
status of celebrity and which have not; it should rather be held that every person 
has the property right of publicity, but that the damages which a person may claim 
for infringement of the right will turn upon the value of the publicity appropriated 
which in turn will depend in great measure upon the degree of fame attained by 
the plaintiff.  Thus, the right of publicity accorded to each individual ‘may have 
much or little, or only a nominal value,’ but the right should be available to 
everyone.36
By the 1990s, the right of publicity had developed into a well established doctrine 
accepted by most courts, exemplified by its inclusion in the 1995 Restatement of Unfair 
Competition: “[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity by 
using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for 
purposes of trade . . .”37
Nevertheless, in the years following the Haelan decision, most courts refused to 
legitimize the new cause of action, particularly because of its “important economic and 
social implications.”38  The First Amendment provided effective ammunition for courts 
wishing to eradicate publicity rights.
33 Haelan, 202 F.2d 866 at 868.
34 Cardtoons, 95 F.2d at 967.  
35
 Breslin, supra note 1, at 375-76.
36
 Melvin B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 Law & Contemp. Probs. 203, 204 (1954) (citing O’Brien 
v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d at 170).
37
 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (1995). 
38
 Breslin, supra note 1, at 377.
9III.  The Battle for Legitimacy: Early Cases Defining the Boundary 
Between the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment
A.  Early Balancing of the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment 
In right of publicity cases, courts would abide by the same rules that pertained in 
privacy cases, specifically the distinction between “newsworthy” and “commercial” 
publications.39  However, “what got lost in the process was any recognition that, by the 
1950s and 1960s, those two categories were no longer synonymous with protected and 
unprotected speech.”40  For example, the Binns line of cases (holding that speech meant 
to entertain should be classified as commercial) was slowly overtaken by Supreme Court 
cases holding that “fiction, film, art and other forms of speech intended to entertain were 
as fully entitled to constitutional protections as was classically ‘newsworthy’ speech.”41
In 1973, the Supreme Court explicitly made clear that “pictures, films, paintings, 
drawings, and engravings . . . have First Amendment protection.”42
Even speech that directly proposed a commercial transaction, which was entirely 
unprotected prior to 1976, was afforded some measure of First Amendment protection by 
the Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc.43 Thus, courts attempting to utilize the “commercial/newsworthy” 
39
 Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 8.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 9.  See, e.g. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (music independent of its lyrics, is 
protected speech); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (plays); Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (American flag bearing a peace symbol); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 
343 U.S. 495 (1952) (motion pictures); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (publications intended 
to entertain). 
42 Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973).
43
 425 U.S. 748 (1976).  See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967) (works published for ‘trade 
purposes’ do not lose First Amendment protection).  
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distinction in determining the boundary between publicity rights and the First 
Amendment were not only left without a map, but also without a compass.  Judges who 
were hostile to the right of publicity used the recent expansion of First Amendment 
protections to deny plaintiffs’ right of publicity claims.
For example, in Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,44 Justice 
Frank of the New York Supreme Court refused to enjoin the publishing of an 
unauthorized biography of Howard Hughes.  Frank explained that “[j]ust as a public 
figure’s ‘right of privacy’ must yield to the public interest so too must the ‘right of 
publicity’ bow where such conflicts with the free dissemination of thoughts, ideas, 
newsworthy events, and matters of public interest.”45  A few months later, Justice Frank 
again used First Amendment principles to “stifle a plaintiff’s attempt to enjoin the 
unauthorized sale of mock presidential campaign posters” depicting a comedian, Pat 
Paulson, as a candidate.46  Justice Frank noted, “[w]hen a well-known entertainer enters 
the presidential ring, tongue in cheek or otherwise, it is clearly newsworthy and of public 
interest.”47  The Supreme Court would not specifically address the right of publicity until 
1977, in the landmark case of Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, Co.48
B.  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, Co.: The Supreme Court 
Tackles the Right of Publicity
44
 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
45 Id. at 129.
46
 Breslin, supra note 1, at 5.
47 Paulson v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
48
 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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Hugo Zacchini was an entertainer who performed a “human cannonball” act in 
which he was shot from a cannon into a net approximately 200 feet away.49  Although 
Zacchini specifically requested that reporters not film his act, a local news station 
videotaped and aired a film clip of his entire fifteen-second performance.50  Zacchini 
brought suit in Ohio for infringement of his common law right of publicity.51  The 
Supreme Court of Ohio held that “[a] TV station has a privilege to report in its newscasts 
matters of legitimate public interest which would otherwise be protected by an 
individual’s right of publicity.”52
The Supreme Court reversed the Ohio court, holding that “the broadcast of a film 
of petitioner’s entire act poses a substantial threat to the economic value of that 
performance.”53 Zacchini, however, was not exactly an overwhelming triumph for the 
right of publicity over the First Amendment.  Conversely, the Court emphasized the 
unique facts of the case, noting that the case involved “not the appropriation of an 
entertainer’s reputation to enhance the attractiveness of a commercial product,” but “goes 
to the heart of petitioner’s ability to earn a living as an entertainer.”54  Thus, the Supreme 
Court’s narrow holding in Zacchini is of little relevance to later cases concerning the 
unauthorized use of celebrity identities to sell a product, such as ETW Corp. v. Jireh 
Publishing, Inc.
Nevertheless, the importance of Zacchini lies in its analysis of the justifications 
for the right of publicity.  The Supreme Court noted that the right of publicity served 
49 Id. at 563.
50 Id. at 564.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 565.
53 Id. at 575.
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“three basic functions: (1) it prevented others from being unjustly enriched by the 
plaintiff’s goodwill, (2) it kept others from interfering with the plaintiff’s right to make a 
living as an entertainer, and (3) it provided entertainers and celebrities an economic 
incentive to continue to invest in creating performances that the public could enjoy.”55
Zacchini is also important for its implicit holding that a state right of publicity claim will 
not be automatically defeated by a First Amendment defense; instead, the Supreme Court 
made clear that the right of publicity and the First Amendment interest in free expression 
must be balanced “according to the relative importance of the interests at stake.”56
IV.  Freeriding on a Celebrity’s Fame and the Birth of the 
“Transformative” Elements Test
In the years following Zacchini, courts have struggled to balance right of publicity 
claims with the First Amendment.  A recent string of cases involving celebrities and 
professional athletes exemplifies the disagreement and disharmony among courts on this 
issue.  
A.  The Second Circuit
In Rogers v. Grimaldi,57 Ginger Rogers sued the producers and distributors of a 
motion picture entitled “Ginger and Fred” for violation of her right of publicity.58  The 
film’s title referred to the names of its two protagonists, Ginger and Fred.  Moreover, the 
54 Id. at 576.
55
 Jacy T. Jasmer, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.: A Workable Standard, An Unworkable Decision, 5 
Minn. Intel. Prop. Rev. 293, 296 (2004). The persuasiveness of each of these justifications with respect to 
professional athletes will be examined further in Part VI of this Note.
56 Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal.4th 387, 401, 21 P.3d 797, 806, 106 
Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 137 (2001)
57
 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989).
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film attempted to contrast the “elegance” of 1940s era American cinema to the 
“gaudiness and banality of contemporary television, which (the director) satirizes).”59
The Second Circuit held that the right of publicity would not bar the use of a 
celebrity’s name in a movie title “unless the title was ‘wholly unrelated’ to the movie or 
was ‘simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.’”60
The court held that the title “Ginger and Fred” was “clearly related to the content of the 
movie and is not a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services 
or a collateral commercial product,” and thus did not violate Rogers’ right of publicity.61
The Second Circuit’s “disguised commercial advertisement” test has been widely 
adopted by other circuits, but limited to cases where the title of an artistic work uses a 
celebrity’s name.  Nevertheless, courts utilizing the Second Circuit test have often arrived 
at contrary results.  In Parks v. LaFace Records,62 the hip- hop group Outkast was sued 
when they used the name of Rosa Parks in a song title that did not convey factual 
information about Parks.  The Sixth Circuit denied Outkast’s motion for summary 
judgment, holding that “a reasonable finder of fact . . . could find the title to be a 
‘disguised commercial advertisement’ or adopted ‘solely to attract attention’ to the 
work.”63  The court found that there was no relationship between the song’s title and its 
content, despite the chorus refrain of “[e]verybody move to the back of the bus.”64
58 Id. at 996.
59 Id. at 1001.
60 Id. at 1004.
61 Id. at 1004-05.
62
 329 F.3d 437 (2003).
63 Id. at 461.
64 Id. at 442.
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In contrast, the Ninth Circuit found that Aqua’s song entitled “Barbie Girl” was 
not a “disguised commercial advertisement” because the group claimed that the song 
used “Barbie’s image” to comment “humorously” on Barbie’s cultural values.65
Although  “Barbie” was not a right of publicity case (the claim was trademark 
infringement), the decision exemplifies the disparate outcomes of cases using the Second 
Circuit test.  Nevertheless, the test has thus far been limited to cases where a product’s 
title uses a celebrity identity, and thus does not apply to cases such as Jireh where a 
celebrity “image” has been appropriated.
B.  The Sixth Circuit
Prior to its decision in Jireh, the Sixth Circuit decided several cases that involved 
balancing the right of publicity with the First Amendment.  In Carson v. Here’s Johnny 
Portable Toilets, Inc., talk show host Johnny Carson sued a toilet manufacturer for using 
Carson’s popular catch phrase.66 The Sixth Circuit found that the defendant had violated 
Carson’s right of publicity, holding that “a celebrity has a protected pecuniary interest in 
the commercial exploitation of his identity.”67  Judge Kennedy’s dissent noted, “public 
policy requires that the public’s interest in free enterprise and free expression take 
precedence over any interest Johnny Carson may have in a phrase associated with his 
person.”68
65 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 907 (9th Cir. 2002).
66
 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
67 Id. at 835.
68 Id. at 841.
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In Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors, Inc.,69 Elvis Presley’s heirs sued 
the defendant for making a large bronze statue and numerous small pewter copies to 
honor the deceased singer.  Although the case “was decided on other grounds,” Judge 
Meritt “referred to the existence of significant First Amendment questions” and “to the 
importance of allowing important information and symbols to enter the public domain 
where all are free to use them.”70
C.  The Tenth Circuit
Seven years before Jireh, the Tenth Circuit decided a case focusing on the right of 
publicity with respect to professional athletes.  In Cardtoons, L.C., v. Makor League 
Baseball Players Assoc.,71 the Tenth Circuit held that baseball card parodies of several 
professional baseball players did not violate the athletes’ rights of publicity.  The court 
“did not base its decision on some special First Amendment status enjoyed by parody . . . 
[r]ather, the court’s discussion took into consideration ordinary trading cards as well, 
terming all of them ‘an important medium for disseminating information.’”72  The court 
found that the cards should receive full First Amendment protection:
Cardtoons’ parody trading cards receive full protection under the First 
Amendment.  The cards provide social commentary on public figures, 
major league baseball players, who are involved in a significant 
commercial enterprise, major league baseball.  While not core political 
speech . . . this type of commentary on an important social institution 
constitutes protected expression.73
69
 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980).
70
 Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 13.
71
 95 F.3d 959, 972 (1996).
72
 Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 11.
73 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 969.
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The Cardtoons court also commented on the potential danger publicity rights pose 
to the public domain.  The court noted that celebrities are a “common point of reference 
for millions of individuals who may never interact,” and that “through their pervasive 
presence in the media, sports and entertainment celebrities come to symbolize certain 
ideas and values . . . [they] are an important element of the shared communicative 
resources of our cultural domain.”74  Thus, overprotection of publicity rights would 
inevitably deprive the public of a valuable component of our modern marketplace of 
ideas.
The Tenth Circuit called into question the viability of publicity rights for 
professional athletes.  With respect to the first Zacchini justification of incentive, the 
court bluntly stated, “[t]he extra income generated by licensing one’s identity does not
provide a necessary inducement to enter and achieve in the realm of sports and 
entertainment.”75  With respect to the second Zacchini justification of depriving 
entertainers of the right to make a living, the Tenth Circuit noted that professional 
athletes receive a more than adequate “rate of return” from their primary profession, and 
furthermore “even in the absence of publicity rights, celebrities would still be able to reap 
financial reward from authorized appearances and endorsements.”76  With respect to the 
third Zacchini justification of unjust enrichment, the court observed, “Cardtoons added a 
significant creative component of its own to the celebrity identity and created an entirely 
new product.”77  In addition, the court noted that “[c]elebrities . . . are often not fully 
74 Id. at 972.
75 Id. at 974.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 976.
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responsible for their fame . . . fame may largely be the creation of the media or the 
audience.”78
Finally, the Tenth Circuit inferred that the right of publicity may best serve the 
public if confined to cases that affect an entertainer’s incentive to perform, such as in 
Zacchini: “[t]he distinction between the value of a person’s identity and the value of his 
performance explains why Zacchini . . . is a red herring . . . the Court’s incentive 
rationale is obviously more compelling in a right of performance case than in a more 
typical right of publicity case involving the appropriation of a celebrity’s identity.”79  The 
Tenth Circuit’s logical dismantling of professional athletes’ publicity rights would play a 
pivotal role in influencing the Sixth Circuit’s decision in the Jireh case seven years later.
D.  The Ninth Circuit
The Supreme Court of California and the Ninth Circuit developed the 
“transformative elements” test through a line of cases beginning with White v. Samsung 
Electronics America, Inc.80 and ending with Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary 
Saderup, Inc.81
In White, television celebrity Vanna White brought suit, alleging that the 
defendant’s use of a robot wearing a long gown and blonde wig who turned letters on a 
game show set designed to look like “Wheel of Fortune” constituted a violation of her 
publicity rights.  The Ninth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment for the 
78 Id. at 975.
79 Id. at 973.
80
 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
81
 25 Cal.4th 387, 401, 21 P.3d 797, 806, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 137 (2001)
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defendant, and a suggestion for rehearing en banc failed.82  In a blistering dissent, Judge 
Kozinski explained that overprotection of such intellectual property rights would cause 
harm to the public domain:
Something very dangerous is going on here . . . Overprotecting intellectual 
property is as harmful as underprotecting it.  Creativity is impossible 
without a rich public domain . . . Intellectual property rights aren’t free: 
They’re imposed at the expense of future creators and of the public at 
large . . . This is why intellectual property law is full of careful balances 
between what’s set aside for the owner and what’s left in the public 
domain for the rest of us[.]83
The Ninth Circuit’s next right of publicity decision came in Hoffman v. Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc.84  In Hoffman, actor Dustin Hoffman alleged that a magazine used an 
unauthorized still photograph from the movie Tootsie which used computer generated 
images to falsely depict him wearing recent spring fashions.  The magazine article 
contained sixteen familiar scenes of famous actors used to show what they’d look like in 
contemporary designer clothing.  The Ninth Circuit found that the article used “a 
combination of fashion photography, humor, and visual and verbal editorial comment” on 
classic films, and any commercial aspects were “inextricably intertwined with expressive 
elements.”85  The Hoffman “expressive elements” test would serve as the basis of the 
California Supreme Court’s “transformative” test set forth in Comedy.
Finally, in Comedy, the owner of all rights to the Three Stooges comedy team 
brought suit against an artist selling lithographic prints of the Stooges on t-shirts.  The 
court first found that the drawings contained “expressive elements,” and therefore were 
82 White, 989 F.2d at 1512.
83 Id. at 1516.
84 255 F.3d 1180, 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1993, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363 (9th Cir. 2001).
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entitled to First Amendment protection because they were not merely an “advertisement 
or endorsement of a product.”86  The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the t-
shirts lost First Amendment protection because they were sold via multiple 
reproductions: “[A] reproduction of a celebrity image that . . . contains significant 
creative elements is entitled to as much First Amendment protection as an original work 
of art.”87
In finding that the plaintiff’s publicity rights had been violated, the court set forth 
the “transformative elements” test for determining the proper balance between the right 
of publicity and the First Amendment: 
When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or imitation 
of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on the right of 
publicity without adding significant expression beyond that trespass, [the 
right of publicity trumps the First Amendment].  On the other hand, when 
a work contains significant transformative elements, it is not only 
especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but it is also less likely 
to interfere with the economic interest protected by the right of publicity.88
The court added that another way to view the test is “whether the celebrity 
likeness is one of raw materials from which the original work was synthesized,” or 
whether the celebrity image is the “very sum and substance of the work.”89  The court 
then added yet another “useful subsidiary inquiry” to be used in close cases: “does the 
85 Id. at 1185.
86
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88 Id. at 405.
89 Id. at 406.
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marketability and economic value of the challenged work derive primarily from the fame 
of the celebrity depicted?”90
Adding further to the confusion of the “transformative” test, the court explained 
that the First Amendment may protect even literal reproductions of a celebrity, noting 
that painter Andy Warhol was able to convey the “dehumanization of celebrity itself” 
through literal depiction.91
After sorting through the semantic acrobatics of the Comedy decision, the 
“transformative test” would appear to consist of the following inquiry.  First, did the 
plaintiff appropriate the defendant’s identity for commercial gain without the plaintiff’s 
consent?  If the answer is yes, then the defendant may assert First Amendment protection 
as an affirmative defense.  The defendant must show that (1) the use was not a purely 
commercial “advertisement or endorsement of a product,” and thus qualified for First 
Amendment protection, and (2) the use was not a literal depiction of the celebrity, but 
contained significant “transformative” elements.  Finally, if the court has difficulty 
deciding the prior inquiry, it should (3) find for the plaintiff if the marketability of the 
product derives primarily from the celebrity’s fame.  To add to the confusion, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that courts may completely disregard the “literal depiction” portion of the 
“transformative” test in cases featuring “subtle” artists such as Andy Warhol.
Although far from clear, the Comedy “transformative elements” test at least 
provided some direction for courts in future right of publicity cases.  Two years after 
90 Id. at 407.
91 Id. at 408-09.
21
Comedy, the Sixth Circuit would assay the viability of the Ninth Circuit transformative 
test in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.
V.  ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc: The “Tiger Woods” Case
Sports artist Rick Rush has painted some of America’s most famous athletes for 
over twenty-five years.  Rush’s vast collection of sports paintings include Michael 
Jordan, Wayne Gretzky, Cal Ripken, and Mark McGwire.92  In 1997, Rush painted a 
picture of Tiger Woods playing golf in the 1997 Master’s Tournament.  Entitled “The 
Masters of Augusts,” the painting depicts “Woods in three different poses, against a 
backdrop of the Augusta National clubhouse, the leader board, and images of legendary 
champions, including Sam Snead, Walter Hagan, Bobby Jones, Ben Hogan, Jack 
Nicklaus, and Arnold Palmer.93  Rush’s publisher, Jireh, distributed limited edition prints 
of Rush’s painting.94
The Eldrick Tiger Woods Corporation (ETW) brought suit against Jireh, alleging 
(among several other charges) that Jireh violated Wood’s right of publicity under Ohio 
common law.95  Jireh countered that the First Amendment protected the prints because 
they were “artwork” and not commercial speech.96
A.  The District Court Grants Jireh’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
The Ohio District Court granted Jireh’s motion for summary judgment on the 
right to publicity claim, holding that Rush’s paintings went beyond merely “proposing a 
92
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commercial transaction.” and were therefore protected by the First Amendment.97  The 
court quoted the Second Circuit’s decision in Bery v. City of New York: “paintings, 
photographs, prints and sculptures ... always communicate some idea or concept to those 
who view it, and as such are entitled to full First Amendment protection." 98 The court 
held that Rush’s painting was “an artistic creation seeking to express a message.  The fact 
that it is sold is irrelevant to the determination of whether it receives First Amendment 
protection.”99  Since the First Amendment protected the painting, the court noted, no 
balancing test was needed; the First Amendment always trumps a right of publicity claim.
B.  The Sixth Circuit Upholds the District Court Decision
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the District Court decision, albeit with an 
entirely different analysis.  The court first looked to the Restatement of Unfair 
Competition to determine the “common law” definition of the right of publicity: “The 
current version of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defined the right as . . . 
‘[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without 
consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade . . 
.”
100
  The court utilized the Restatement Definition and accompanying Comments to 
articulate a test for finding whether the Woods’s right of publicity had been violated: 
“Under this rule, the substantiality and market effect of the use of the celebrity’s image is 
analyzed in light of the informational and creative content of the defendant’s use.”101
In concluding that Rush’s painting had “substantial informational and creative 
content which outweighs any adverse effect on ETW’s market,” the court noted that 
97 Id. at 835.
98
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Rush’s painting consisted of much more than the literal likeness of Tiger Woods: “It is a 
panorama of Woods’s victory at the 1997 Masters Tournament . . . [a] piece of art that 
portrays a historic sporting event communicates and celebrates the value our culture 
attaches to such events . . . Rush’s work conveys the message that Woods himself will 
someday join [the revered group of Masters champions].”102
Although the court could have concluded its analysis in finding that Woods’s 
right of publicity had not been violated, it further found that Rush’s work was 
“expression which is entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment.”103  In 
making its determination, the court quoted Cardtoons: “sports and entertainment 
celebrities . . . have become a valuable means of expression in our culture.”104  The court 
held that Rush’s prints “are not commercial speech.  They do not propose a commercial 
transaction.  Accordingly, they are entitled to the full protection of the First 
Amendment.”105
The court then proceeded to use the Comedy “transformative elements” to 
balance Woods’s publicity rights against the First Amendment.  Before beginning its 
“transformative” analysis, the court noted that Woods’s primary employment was playing 
golf, not licensing his image:
“Woods, like most sports and entertainment celebrities . . . engages in an 
activity, professional golf, that in itself generates a significant amount of 
income which is unrelated to his right of publicity . . . [i]t is not al all clear 
that the appearance of Woods’s likeness in artwork prints which display 
one of his major achievements will reduce the commercial value of his 
likeness.”106
101 Id. at 937.
102 Id. at 936.
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105 Id. At 925.
106 Id. at 938.
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In finding that Rush’s prints contained transformative elements, the court 
essentially echoed its findings with respect to the Restatement test: 
Unlike the unadorned, nearly photographic reproduction of the faces of 
The Three Stooges in Comedy III, Rush’s work does not capitalize solely 
on a literal depiction of Woods.  Rather, Rush’s work consists of a collage 
of images in addition to Woods’s image which are combined to describe, 
in artistic form, a historic even in sports history and to convey a message 
about the significance of Woods’s achievement in that event.  Because 
Rush’s work has substantial transformative elements . . . Woods’s right of 
publicity must yield to the First Amendment.107
Although the Jireh majority applied the correct “transformative elements” test to 
find that the First Amendment trumped Woods’s publicity rights, the opinion as a whole 
featured several problems.  
C.  Problems with the Majority Opinion
First, although the court found that Woods’s right of publicity had not been 
violated pursuant to the common law Restatement test, the court continued to discuss 
whether Rush’s prints should receive First Amendment protection and then applied the 
“transformative” balancing test.  However, the Restatement inquiry provides essentially 
the same balancing test as the Comedy test.  In other words, when the court found that 
Woods’s right of publicity had not been violated pursuant to the Restatement test, it in 
essence already found the following: (1) Rush’s work did not merely propose a 
commercial transaction, and thus offered “substantial informational and creative content” 
protected under the First Amendment; and (2) the “substantial informational and creative 
content” of Rush’s work outweighed Woods’s right of publicity.  Thus, by applying both 
the Restatement test and the transformative test, the court balanced Woods’s right of 
publicity with the First Amendment twice.  Assuming arguendo that the court had 
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reached different conclusions with respect to the two tests, it is unclear which balancing 
test would trump.  More importantly, once the court stated that Woods’s right of publicity 
had not been violated, the inquiry should have ended.
Second, the court may not have correctly applied the Comedy transformative test.  
Comedy makes clear that the “transformative elements” test should be utilized as an 
affirmative defense.108  The Sixth Circuit, however, failed to make clear which party had 
the burden of proving whether Rush’s work contained transformative elements.  In fact, 
the Jireh court seemed to apply all three tests (i.e. the Restatement test, the First 
Amendment test, and the transformative test) as threshold inquiries in determining 
whether Woods’s right of publicity had been violated.  Moreover, assuming the court did
apply the transformative test as an affirmative defense, the test would have been moot 
because the court had already found that Woods’s right of publicity had not been 
violated.
Finally, the court considered the “literal depiction” prong of the Comedy test, but 
failed to inquire into the subsidiary “marketability” prong.  Although the Comedy court 
merely offered the second prong as a “subsidiary inquiry” which courts “may find useful 
. . . in close cases,” it would be difficult to argue that Jireh was not a “close” case.109
D. Judge Clay’s Dissent
The Jireh majority opinion clearly left itself vulnerable to criticism, which was 
plentifully supplied by Judge Clay’s blistering dissent.  Judge Clay first pointed out the 
obvious: “[t]he majority makes a somewhat disjointed holding regarding Plaintiff’s right 
107 Id.
108 Comedy, 25 Cal.4th at 407 (holding that “[i]n sum, when an artist is faced with a right of publicity 
challenge to his or her work, he or she may raise as affirmative defense that the work is protected by the 
First Amendment inasmuch as it contains significant transformative elements . . .”).
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of publicity claim . . . it appears that the majority engages in three separate analyses, and 
arrives at three separate holdings, although all of which reach the same result.”110
According to Judge Clay, the Comedy transformative elements test was “the 
approach best suited” for determining whether Rush’s prints deserved First Amendment 
protection.111  Applying the test, Clay observed that it was difficult to “discern any 
appreciable transformative or creative contribution in Defendant’s prints . . .”112  Clay 
argued that Rush’s “overall goal” was to create “literal, conventional depictions of [Tiger 
Woods] so as to exploit his . . . fame [such that Rush’s] right of free expression is 
outweighed by [Woods’] right of publicity.”113
Nevertheless, Judge Clay’s “transformative” analysis cut away from the Comedy
“literal depiction” inquiry and instead focused on whether the “focus” of the work was 
the celebrity: “the clear focus of the work is Woods in full body image . . . the focus of 
the print is not the Masters Tournament or the other golfers . . . but that of Woods holding 
his famous golf swing while at that tournament.”114  To exemplify his point, Judge Clay 
noted that the narrative accompanying the prints expressly discussed Woods, reading in 
part, “the center of [other golfers’] gaze is 1997 winner Tiger Woods . . .”115  Therefore, 
Judge Clay concluded, “it is clear that the prints gain their commercial value by 
exploiting the fame and celebrity status that Woods has worked to achieve.”116
109 Id. 
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27
However, apart from one sentence mentioning that Rush’s overall goal was to 
create “literal, conventional” depictions of Woods, Judge Clay failed to explain why he 
viewed Rush’s painting as a literal depiction of Woods.  Instead, Judge Clay concentrated 
on the Comedy subsidiary “marketability” inquiry, arguing that the focus of Rush’s 
painting is Tiger Woods, and therefore the prints gain their commercial value by 
exploiting Woods’s celebrity.  
In sum, although Judge Clay ostensibly found that Rush’s picture was a literal 
depiction of Woods, his analysis gave only lip-service to the Comedy literal depiction 
inquiry.  Thus, both the majority and dissent applications of the “transformative 
elements” test were suspect.  
VI. Beyond Transformative:  The Future of the Right of Publicity
The Sixth Circuit decision in Jireh has given courts little guidance in how to 
properly balance the right of publicity with the First Amendment.  Following the 
controversial decision, many commentators have weighed in on how effective balancing 
should be conducted in the future.  Nevertheless, the proposed “solutions” are often more 
fraught with problems than the test applied in Jireh.
A.  The “Marketability” Test
The majority of commentators have argued that the Jireh majority did not give 
enough deference to the “marketability” prong of the Comedy test.  Michael Breslin 
believes that a “proper analysis” of the transformative test “would not have ignored the 
lack of transformative elements in the images of Woods himself nor would it have 
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ignored the subsidiary inquiry as to the true source of the painting’s marketability.”117  To 
further his point, Breslin posits the question, “[h]ow marketable would the painting be if 
a generic golfer, rather than Tiger Woods, was the centerpiece of the work?”118  Breslin 
argues that the “marketability” analysis would prevent “trivial elements” and “a few
supplementary elements in the backdrop” of a work from diverting judges’ attentions 
away from where the true economic value of a painting lies.119
Jacy Jasmer believes that the “transformative” test should apply as an affirmative 
defense, where the defendant not only has the burden of showing that the artwork 
“contains significant transformative elements,” but also that the “marketability and 
economic value of the challenged work does not derive from the fame of the celebrity 
depicted.”120  Thus, Jasmer believes that the Comedy test should be modified in that the 
“subsidiary inquiry” should be promoted to a mandatory inquiry that must be proven 
before a defendant is afforded First Amendment protection.
Nevertheless, heavy reliance on the “marketability” inquiry would cause vast 
overprotection of publicity rights at the expense of the public domain.  For example, few 
would argue that a biography of Michael Jordan does not contain “expressive elements” 
such that it should be afforded First Amendment protection, regardless of the fact that it 
is sold commercially.  It is equally difficult, however, to argue that the primary 
marketability of such a biography would not stem primarily from the fame of Michael 
117
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Jordan.121  Thus, under Breslin’s “marketability” test, Michael Jordan would be able to 
sue biographers at will.  Moreover, even under Jasmer’s more liberal “transformative” 
test, a biographer might satisfy the “expressive elements” prong, but would always fail to 
meet his burden of proving that the marketability of the biography does not stem 
primarily from the celebrity of Michael Jordan.  
The dangers of relying on a work’s “marketability” are not unique to biographies.  
Many expressive works utilizing celebrity personas derive their primary marketability 
from the celebrity depicted, including t-shirts, magazines, posters, and television 
programs.  For example, parody, a form of speech that has been historically protected by 
courts under the First Amendment, would be in danger.  Could the estate of James Dean 
sue artist Gottfried Helnwein for his parody Boulevard of Broken Dreams, which features 
Dean and other tragic celebrity figures?  As Breslin would argue, if Dean, Marilyn 
Monroe, Elvis Presley, and Humphrey Bogart were replaced with four “generic” figures, 
the painting would be virtually worthless.  Similarly, baseball trading cards would also be 
subject to right of publicity claims, and the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Cardtoons would 
be turned on its head.
Thus, the Comedy subsidiary inquiry should not be utilized because it sets forth a 
virtually insurmountable hurdle for the First Amendment.  Even the most artistic use of a 
celebrity image will often derive most of its marketability from the celebrity’s fame; if a 
“generic” person were used, biographies and paintings would be deprived of their 
substance.  In sum, regardless of the “expressive” content of the work, defendants would 
121
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be at a loss to prove that consumers are attracted to a work because of its expressive 
elements and not the celebrity depicted.  As the Tenth Circuit noted in Cardtoons, social 
comment and marketable celebrity personas are often inextricably intertwined.
B. The “Transformative Elements” Test
Although less problematic than the pure “marketability” test, the basic Comedy
transformative test still suffers from an array of problems.  The Jireh decision highlights 
many of the test’s inefficiencies.  
First, the “transformative elements” test is impossible to consistently apply.  The 
Supreme Court of California admitted as much when setting forth the test: “[a]lthough 
the distinction between protected and unprotected expression will sometimes be subtle, it 
is no more so than other distinctions triers of fact are called on to make in First 
Amendment jurisprudence.”122
One need look no further than the Jireh decision to demonstrate the inherent 
unpredictability of the transformative test.  The majority found that Rush’s painting 
consisted of much more that a “mere literal likeness of Woods,” and was in fact a “piece 
of art that portrays a historic event” and “communicates and celebrates the value our 
culture attaches to such events.”123  Conversely, Judge Clay found it “difficult to discern 
any appreciable transformative or creative contribution” in Rush’s prints.124  Thus, the 
transformative test is far from a bright line rule that can be applied consistently; indeed, 
judges’ subjective perceptions of what constitutes artistic expression is entirely 
122 Comedy, 25 Cal.4th at 409.
123 ETW, 332 F.3d at 936.
124 Id. at 959.
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determinative of how a right of publicity case is decided.  Nevertheless, an attempt to 
objectively define what constitutes artistic expression or a “literal depiction” would 
undoubtedly be even more problematic.
Second, courts seem confused as to whether the transformative test should be 
applied as an affirmative defense.  Although the Comedy court explicitly formulated the 
test as such, the court in Jireh seemed to place the burden of proof on the plaintiff.  Much 
of the confusion in Jireh is attributable to the fact that the court first applied the 
Restatement test, which is virtually the same as the “transformative test” except for the 
Restatement’s burden of proof, which is on the celebrity plaintiff in the first instance. 
Nevertheless, so long as there is a right of publicity that needs to be balanced 
against the First Amendment, the transformative test may well be the proverbial least of 
many evils.  The test is at least feasible in that it (1) gives proper deference to First 
Amendment concerns; (2) allows courts the flexibility to “make necessary fact specific 
determinations”125; and (3) is far superior to most alternative approaches.  In fact, when 
compared to other proposed solutions, the transformative test looks like a veritable stroke 
of genius by the Supreme Court of California.
C. Other Proposed Solutions
Legal scholars have proffered several other solutions to the right of publicity 
dilemma.  First, one scholar has proposed to eliminate subjectivity entirely by classifying 
works into one of two categories: “Popular Art” or “Fine Art.”126  This “Cultural Niche 
Theory” asks the finder of fact to “determine whether a work’s purpose is to ‘entertain, to 
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stimulate emotion or project sentimentality’ [evidence suggesting ‘Popular Art’] or to 
‘exhibit a personal expression, originality, [or] creativity’ [evidence suggesting ‘Fine 
Art’].”127  The First Amendment would protect celebrity personas used in “Fine Art”, 
whereas the use of celebrity personas in “Popular Art” would not be protected.
The problems with this test are too numerous to mention in entirety, but include 
the following: (1) the test is not objective at all, and merely passes the subjective 
judgment of what “category” a work falls into from the judge to the jury; (2) some (if not 
most) art could fall into either category; and (3) by focusing on the “type” and “quality” 
of art and not the amount of celebrity fame appropriated, the test completely ignores the 
critical inquiry in publicity rights cases, specifically whether the defendant is using the 
celebrity for expressive purposes or merely free-riding off celebrity fame.  To quote the 
Comedy court, the “inquiry is in a sense more quantitative than qualitative . . .”128
Second, a number of scholars have proposed incorporating the entire “fair use” 
defense from copyright law and applying it to right of publicity cases.129  However, “the 
factors used in copyright analysis do not readily lend themselves to right of publicity 
claims.”130  For instance, as the court in Comedy explained:
We conclude that a wholesale importation of the fair use doctrine into 
right of publicity law would not be advisable.  At least two of the factors 
employed in the fair use test, ‘the nature of the copyrighted work’ and ‘the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used’ seem particularly designed 
to be applied to the partial copying of works  . . . fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression; it is difficult to understand why these factors 
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would be especially useful for determining whether the depiction of a 
celebrity likeness is protected by the First Amendment.131
Furthermore, the third factor, “the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work,” would not only be difficult to ascertain in the right of 
publicity context, by may tip the balance toward plaintiffs because “it could be argued 
that if a defendant has capitalized in any way on a celebrity’s image, he or she has found 
a potential market and therefore could be liable for such work.”132  Thus, since this factor 
would almost always cut against the defendant, the defendant would “face what is 
effectively a presumption of infringement” from the outset.133
Moreover, the aims of copyright and the right of publicity are divergent.  
Copyright law “protects the primary, if not only source of a writer’s income, and thus 
provides a significant incentive for creativity and achievement.”134  The right of publicity, 
however, only protects this incentive in the limited context of “performance” cases such 
as Zacchini.  The commercial value of professional athlete and celebrity identities is 
“merely a by-product of their performance values.”135  Copyright is designed to balance 
artists’ rights and the need for a rich public domain by affording artists’ exclusive rights 
for a limited duration.  Conversely, many jurisdictions have held that the right of 
publicity “exists posthumously and is both inheritable and devisable,” with no limited 
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time duration.136  Thus, it makes little sense to blindly import copyright doctrine into 
right of publicity cases.
VI. Should Publicity Rights Be Protected?  Debunking the 
Justifications for a Right of Publicity
As one critic of publicity rights astutely noted, “[f]ame existed long before the 
right of publicity was invented, and no one apparently needed the law’s protection to 
become famous before this century.”137  Inherent in this simple statement is a 
fundamental question:  Do we need a right of publicity for professional athletes and 
celebrities at all?
To answer this question, it is necessary to re-examine the three justification for 
the right of publicity as given by the Supreme Court in Zacchini: (1) it provides 
celebrities an economic incentive to invest in creating performances; (2) it keeps others 
from interfering with the celebrity’s right to make a living; and (3) it prevents unjust 
enrichment and misappropriation of the celebrity’s goodwill.
A.  Incentive and the Right to Make a Living
As previously noted, the first two justifications make little sense when applied to 
professional athletes and celebrities outside the Zacchini context.  To reiterate, the 
“incentive” rationale is only compelling in “right of performance” cases, where a 
performer is deprived of the economic incentive to invest in his primary source of his 
income.  As the Tenth Circuit noted, “it is unlikely that little leaguers will stop dreaming 
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of the big leagues or major leaguers will start ‘dogging it’ to first base” if the right of 
publicity did not exist.138  The second Zacchini justification is also only compelling in 
“right of performance” cases; allowing Rick Rush to paint an image of Tiger Woods will 
not interfere with Woods’ ability to make a living as a professional golfer. 
Michael Breslin counters that courts such as Jireh ignore the long hours of labor 
required for an athlete to attain fame and fortune.  Specifically, Breslin believes that the 
implications of downplaying the second Zacchini justification are “disturbingly 
straightforward”: “the more money you earn, the less right you have to control how 
people exploit your image.”139  Breslin’s analysis, however, misses the point.  
Courts such as Jireh and Cardtoons are not making distinction based on amount of 
wealth, but rather source  of wealth.  To illustrate this point, even if Zacchini had made 
millions off of his “human cannonball” act, the Supreme Court would likely have still 
found a violation of his right of publicity because his performance (or his primary means 
of employment) was appropriated and shown for free, which thereby threatened his 
ability to make a living off that performance.  Zacchini’s wealth was entirely irrelevant to 
the outcome of the case.  Similarly, if Rush had painted a picture of a famous ballplayer 
who had recently declared bankruptcy, the case would have come out the same because 
the “commercial value of [his] identity” would merely be a “by-product” of his 
performance value, and thus would not affect the player’s ability to make a living by
playing baseball.140
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B.  Unjust Enrichment
“Unjust enrichment” is the sole remaining justification for giving publicity rights 
to professional athletes.  This argument is justified on two grounds: (1) professional 
athletes and celebrities should be allowed to enjoy the fruits of their labors, and (2) no 
“social purpose is served” by allowing others to get a “free ride” off of someone else’s 
goodwill.141
Inherent in the first argument is the belief that people have earned the right to 
control and profit off of their commercial identities.  Nevertheless, celebrities “are often 
not fully responsible for their fame . . . a celebrity’s fame may largely be the creation of 
the media or the audience.”142  A celebrity “cannot make herself famous any more than 
she can make herself loved.”143  Although professional athletes are admittedly more 
responsible for their celebrity status than entertainment celebrities, it is also true that 
“[m]any people make valuable contributions to society without receiving compensation 
that reflects every cent of that value.”144  An Amicus Brief in support of Jireh sets forth 
this argument as follows:
Judges . . . create social value far in excess of their compensation.  Law 
professors, too, have never expected royalties from former students, 
although arguably the information the professors produce is a factor in 
producing the high income many earn in practice . . . As long as the 
rewards are adequate to induce talented people into teaching, onto the 
bench, or into the business of making desirable products, how excess 
value should be distributed is a policy question and not one of justice . . . 
celebrities have no greater claim to the excess value they generate than do 
any other actors in society.145
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The “free-rider argument” also has flaws in the context of First Amendment cases 
such as Cardtoons, Comedy and Jireh.  For example, in Jireh, “a substantial part of the 
value of the Rush print must, in all fairness, be attributed to his own talent and fame as a 
sports artist.”146  It is difficult to argue that a celebrity’s fame is the only reason anyone 
would purchase a product; would a three-year-old’s crayon drawing of the Three Stooges 
or Tiger Woods generally be a marketable product?  The answer is likely in the negative.     
Similarly, in the advertising context, it could be argued that merely placing a 
celebrity’s likeness in the background of a commercial would not instantly make that 
commercial successful.  A commercial’s popularity also depends on the skill of the 
marketing department in generating humor or a memorable sales pitch.  For instance, in 
White, Samsung used the “robot” Vanna White to convey that Samsung would exist 
many years into the future.  As Judge Kozinski noted, Samsung’s ad “didn’t simply copy 
White’s schtick – like all parody, it created something new.”147  Furthermore, most 
advertisement right of publicity cases that fall outside of the “false endorsement” context 
do not explicitly invoke the “name, likeness, signature or voice” of a celebrity,” but many 
courts now grant celebrities an “exclusive right to anything that reminds the viewer of 
her.”148  Judge Kozinski believes that “the right to draw ideas from a rich and varied 
public domain, and the right to mock, for profit as well as fun, the cultural icons of our 
time” should limit celebrity “rights” of such broad proportion.149
146 Id. at 28.
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It should be noted that if a commercial utilizes a celebrity image to falsely suggest 
that the celebrity is endorsing the product, the unjust enrichment argument is infinitely 
more persuasive.  Nevertheless, the Lanham Act already provides nationwide protection 
against false or misleading representations in connection with the sale of products.150
Moreover, a “false endorsement” tort strictly limited to such claims would provide a far 
more suitable solution than the right of publicity, which is infinitely broader in scope.
C. Emotional Injury
Several other justifications have been offered in support of a right of publicity, 
most of which are of little merit.  One argument is that the right of publicity prevents 
“emotional injuries.”151  Publicity right, however, are designed to protect against the “loss 
of financial gain, not mental anguish.”152  In addition, tort laws prohibiting the 
“intentional infliction of emotional distress” are available.153  Furthermore, defamation 
law has made clear that those who enjoy the “public limelight” assume the risk of 
criticism.154
D.  Efficient Allocation of Resources
Some courts and commentators have argued that the right of publicity promotes 
the “efficient allocation of resources.”155  This “tragedy of the commons” line of 
150 Comedy, 95 F.3d at 975.  Whether the Lanham Act offers adequate compensation for celebrities who are 
falsely suggested to endorse a product is a separate question which requires a note to itself, and therefore is 
not addressed here.  Nevertheless, it would clearly be ill-advised for the courts to maintain a right of 
publicity solely because the Lanham Act does not offer adequate compensation.  Congress could better 
address the issue.
151 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Cardtoons,  95 F.3d at 974.
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argument posits that “[w]ithout the artificial scarcity created by publicity rights, identities 
would be commercially exploited until the marginal value of each use is zero.”156  First, 
this argument is not persuasive outside the advertising context, as frequent use of a 
celebrity image may actually increase its value precisely because “everybody’s got 
one.”157  For instance, a t-shirt featuring Britney Spears may act as an “advertisement” of 
sorts for her “celebrity” status.  The t-shirt would in effect promote Spears, and therefore 
increase the value of her “celebrity”; the more t-shirts that are created, the more 
promotion Spears’ “celebrity” receives.  
Moreover, in the advertising context, Professor Michael Madow argues that well 
before the advertising value of a celebrity’s persona decreases to zero due to 
overexploitation, advertisers will replace her with a “fresh face” from an unlimited 
alternative supply: “After all, there would be no ‘tragedy’ in the classic parable if the 
herdsmen, after depleting their common pasture, could simply move on to another 
one.”158  If one thing is clear, it is that society is in no danger of running out of celebrities 
or professional athletes anytime soon.
VIII. Conclusion
Upon analyzing the justifications for the right of publicity, one could conclude 
that the right of publicity should be strictly limited to “right of performance” cases such 
as Zacchini, where the plaintiff’s incentive and ability to make a living off his or her
performance is endangered.  Moreover, courts and legislatures could fashion a limited 
156 Id.
157 Id. at 975.
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“false endorsement” tort to protect celebrities from advertisers who falsely suggest that a 
celebrity endorses a product.
Apart from “right of performance” and “false endorsement” cases, the most 
persuasive argument for a right of publicity can be made in cases in which an advertiser 
skillfully appropriates an athlete’s image without implying that the celebrity endorses the 
product being sold.  Nevertheless, even where an advertiser uses a celebrity’s image 
solely for the purpose of proposing a commercial transaction, there are valid arguments 
that the advertiser is not entirely “unjustly enriched”; not only is the athlete’s fame not 
completely attributable to the athlete (both the public and the media play a role), but, as 
in White, the advertiser’s skill and talent also play a part in the commercial’s appeal.  
Thus, at most, the right of publicity should be confined to “right of performance” 
cases and traditional commercial advertisements.  In cases such as Hoffman where it is 
unclear whether the commercial use constitutes an “advertisement,” the “transformative 
elements” test should be used to determine whether the use is protected by the First 
Amendment.  
When an individual’s tentative property right collides with the First Amendment 
and the public domain, the public domain should always be given great deference.  This 
should hold true even when the “individual” in question is Tiger Woods.
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